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Beyond patient-centered care: person-centered care for
Parkinson’s disease
Stephen A Buetow1, Pablo Martínez-Martín2, Mark A Hirsch3 and Michael S Okun4
Interest has grown in centering Parkinson’s disease (PD) care provision on the welfare of the patient with PD. By putting the welfare
of patients ﬁrst, this patient-centric focus tends to subordinate the welfare of others including clinicians and carers. A possible
solution is person-centered care. Rather than remove the spotlight from the patients, it widens that light to illuminate moral
interests of all healthcare participants as persons whose welfare is interdependent. It assumes that unwellness among clinicians, for
example, can impact the quality of the PD care they provide, such that caring for clinicians may also optimize the welfare of persons
with PD. For PD, we suggest how the two models differ and why these differences are important to understand and act on to
optimize beneﬁt for participating stakeholders.
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INTRODUCTION
Care, comfort, compassion, and consolation are as important as
ﬁnding a cure for Parkinson’s disease (PD). For some healthcare
professionals, the source of such values is patient-centered care1
because ‘The good physician treats the disease; the great
physician treats the patient who has the disease’.2 However,
critics of patient-centered care view this model as less a solution
than a problem because privileging the welfare of the patient can
deny the same attention to the welfare of others, which may
impact the quality of patient care they can provide.3 Under these
conditions, patient-centered care can struggle to optimize care of
the patient and other healthcare participants. Resolving this
concern may require person-centered care.
Calling this latter model, ‘people-centered care,’ the World
Health Organization has recognized it as a ‘major shift in thinking’
and warned against confusing it with patient-centered care.4
Many health systems nevertheless promote both models of care
without distinguishing between them. Therefore, how the models
differ and why the differences matter is poorly understood. To
address these issues, we apply each model in turn to a
hypothetical patient, Ann, before considering its conceptual
underpinnings.
CASE STUDY
With mid-stage PD, Ann is beginning to experience motor
ﬂuctuations and freezing episodes as well as balance dysfunction.
To manage these symptoms, she takes Carbidopa–Levodopa and,
to reduce its dose and prolong its effect, Entacapone. Ann’s usual
PD clinician works hard to manage Ann’s PD. He has built a
participatory partnership with her to enable them to co-produce
patient-centered care that shares decision-making for Ann’s
beneﬁt. Consistent with the principles and commitments of medical
professionalism,5 he reasons that this care satisﬁes the trust that
society puts in him to put Ann’s welfare ﬁrst. The primacy of Ann’s
welfare reﬂects her increased health needs and diminished
independence in healthcare structures in which patients have
less power than clinicians. Assuming that this power asymmetry
can be problematic, he respects Ann’s autonomy by maximizing
her ability to make informed moral choices as the source of
control6 in shared decisions relating to their care of her PD.
For example, Ann has asked her clinician for permission to
access adjunctive hydrotherapy in an effort to improve her PD
symptoms and quality of life, and decelerate her loss of functional
independence. He knows there is no clear experimental evidence
for the effectiveness of this intervention. Moreover, Ann’s freezing
is a relative contraindication because of concern about drowning
after a fall. He points to stronger evidence for functional beneﬁts
of conventional physiotherapy in PD.7 However, when Ann insists
on trying hydrotherapy, he acknowledges that it may offer her at
least short-term beneﬁts.8,9 So, he agrees to her receiving it under
the supervision of an experienced neurologic physiotherapist with
a hydrotherapy certiﬁcate. The physiotherapist can administer the
intervention in accordance with guideline recommendations7
during ‘on’ periods when her dopaminergic medication is
optimized and works well. This compromise partly satisﬁes each
party. It honors Ann’s preference without giving her everything
she wants, given the clinician’s ambivalence toward her use of
hydrotherapy. However, when he goes on vacation, Ann visits a
different clinician who practises person-centered care rather than
patient-centered care.
The person-centered clinician shows the same unselﬁsh
concern for Ann’s welfare. However, he understands that
providing Ann with optimal patient care can require him not to
neglect the moral interests of others including himself and other
persons with PD. The welfare of all these persons is important to
respect for the sake of their personhood and because their welfare
can impact Ann. In this context, he discloses to her his lack of
experience with using hydrotherapy to treat PD. He recognizes
that her experience of using this intervention could therefore both
beneﬁt her and inform his capacity to share decisions with others
with PD. Believing that people relate naturally to and learn from
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participatory story telling,10 he asks Ann to keep a paper or
electronic diary11 as a ‘meaning-full’ record of what the
hydrotherapy is like for her, and then share it with him.12 The
clinician obtains relief from acting in humble good faith to explore
how this care appears to impact her welfare as a whole person. He
suggests that she could later choose to participate in balance and
resistance training, if she wishes. It could beneﬁt her in a manner
that might also assist others within a supervised PD-speciﬁc
exercise group. For the clinician, this care setting for persons with
shared needs could synchronize PD care-giving and efﬁciently
time-share the same visit with more than one patient. He adds
that she might also consider taking part in a future clinical trial
that may support her motor rehabilitation without compromising
her right to receive the best PD care available, while potentially
helping others by contributing to approved clinical research.
PATIENTS FIRST
Although the meaning of patient-centered care is ‘contested and
obscure’,13 constructions of this collaborative care approach each
obligate physicians to put the welfare of patients ﬁrst by directly
serving these patients’ welfare interest. The approach also
resonates with a commitment by physicians to the principles of
patient autonomy and social justice,5 despite physicians lacking
the means to be fully responsible for implementing them.14 For
such reasons, patient-centered care has struggled to manage the
tension between personal care and population health care and
hold evidence-based medicine to critical account. Moreover, after
half a century, the research evidence is weak, on balance, for
clinical beneﬁts of patient-centered care as a duty-based ethic.
Although research on the safety and effectiveness of patient-
centered care in PD is in its infancy, a recent Cochrane systematic
review reported that patient-centered care’s ‘effects on patient
satisfaction, health behavior, and health status are mixed’.15
An explanation for this ﬁnding is that what commonly passes as
patient-centered care is unfaithful to patient-centered ideals. For
example, in clinical care, patient autonomy is largely a myth.
Persons with PD might slightly adjust their dosing schedules of
dopaminergic drugs between visits, but they cannot determine
their own medical treatments. Largely restricted to accepting or
not what clinicians offer them,16 patients ﬁnd that their moral
interests are ‘honored (but not mindlessly enacted)’.17 Therefore,
in empowering patients and their care partners (such as spouses
and family members) to lead the transformation of health care
through roles such as active participant peer coaches,18 clinicians
remain in charge; indeed, even ‘expert patients’ with PD may
exemplify ‘a paradox of patient empowerment and medical
dominance’.19 Moreover, even if persons with PD could control
their healthcare decisions in clinical settings, this would not ﬁx
conceptual problems with patient-centered care.
In particular, putting patient welfare ﬁrst is ‘controversial at best,
morally offensive at worst’.20 In practice, the principle invites
exceptions. From surveying the literature, bioethicist David
Wendler21 documented 27 widely acknowledged exceptions to
clinicians acting in the best interests of the present patient vis-à-
vis competing claims. Wendler advocated for an oversight
authority to give guidance on which exceptions are legitimate
and how to manage them. Yet the problem is much less a failure
to provide a ‘compelling justiﬁcation’ for the exceptions than how
primacy of patient welfare marginalizes clinicians and others
whose welfare impacts patients. Here, ‘the ﬂaw in the metaphor
(of patient-centredness) is that the patient and the doctor must
coexist in a therapeutic, social, and economic relation of mutual
and highly interwoven prerogatives. Neither is the king, and
neither is the sun’.22 Our concern is that by subordinating their
own welfare interest, clinicians who practise patient-centered care
may contribute to widespread clinician unwellness.23 We are
unaware of empirical research linking patient-centered care to
work-related stress in clinicians. However, clinicians who devalue
their self-care could compromise their personal health and
thereby weaken their ability to care optimally for persons with PD.
PERSONS FIRST
Advocacy of patient-centered care for PD1,24 sidesteps why
limitations of this care motivate the development of other care
models including relationship-centered care,25 values-based
care,26 whole person-care,27 and person-centered care. The last
model recognizes at the center of health care all participants as
persons whose welfare interconnects. In practice, however, there
is still a tendency to interchange the terms, ‘individual,’ ‘patient’,
and ‘person’28 and deﬁne person-centered care either as
synonymous with patient-centered care or as a type of patient-
centered care.13 The latter practice misses the point that the need
to treat patients as persons is insufﬁcient because not all persons
are patients. When person-centered care speaks in an undertone
to the clinician-as-person, it merely re-dresses in new clothes the
model of patient-centered care that already recognizes the patient
as a person. We therefore reconceptualize person-centered care to
respect and balance competing moral interests and capabilities of
not only the patient but also the clinician and other healthcare
participants.3
Rather than take the spotlight off the person with PD, this
model enlarges this light. In an expanded center of health care, it
illuminates how all participants share the moral standing of
persons. Recognizing all human beings as persons, it respects their
dignity and need for caring and welfare beyond their different
social roles such as patient or clinician. Persons rather than
patients come ﬁrst by caring for each other and themselves
according to their capabilities in their particular situation. In
contrast to patient-centered care as a professional duty, a virtue
ethic emphasizing character development underpins such person-
centered care.
The virtues are stable traits of good character that dispose
persons relationally to develop their varying capabilities to make
good decisions and live good lives (ﬂourish). From our perspec-
tive, the virtues indicate not moral saintliness but rather a middle
path between excess and deﬁciency. Thus, evident in our case
study were virtues such as humility, tolerance, and good faith. It
follows that person-centered PD care depends less on abstract
moral principles for patient welfare than on the prior development
and exercise of values and good character.
Table 1 summarizes how person-centered care differs from
patient-centered care. Comparisons of attributes of these models
reveal their differences. Patient-centered care emphasizes a duty
to care for the health of patients ﬁrst, implicitly as persons. In
contrast, person-centered care makes explicit the personhood of
all participatory stakeholders whose values and virtues dispose
them to live the best life they can through interconnected life
projects.3 Examples of these virtues include good faith (which
expands the meaning of autonomy to include authenticity); justice
as reﬂected in the principle of ‘equal consideration of equal
interests,’ such as respect for all persons; and prudence in
synthesizing science, virtue and the faith-based traditions. This
integration of science with care is more balanced than patient-
centered care that, until recently,29 has been quiet on the need for
evidence to inform clinical practice. However, person-centered PD
care requires comparative studies of cost and effectiveness.
In the Netherlands, a community-based professional network
has reduced healthcare costs for PD30 but did not test our
conceptualization of person-centered care. Hence, an unmet need
exists to assess empirically the operational implications of
resource allocation to our model. There is scope, for example, to
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of ‘at home’ PD care including
daily, remote monitoring of PD. Such care is growing in
affordability and has the potential to improve patient access, to
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help clinicians recognize and treat ﬂuctuating motor and
nonmotor PD symptoms, and to ‘allow more-extensive, less-
expensive participation in research’.31
Such evaluations should follow the implementation of our
model. Its foundation in virtue ethics ﬁts a civic theoretical
perspective that requires communities to produce social arrange-
ments for cultivating and exercising good character. Medical
schools can build on the character development of recruited
students through building a community of moral practice faithful
to the values of person-centredness. Life-long learning can
continue via self-reﬂection, modeling, coaching, and group
discussions in organizations and systems exemplifying these
moral values. These processes can be expected to help clinicians
to self-care and partner with persons with PD and their caregivers
so that each may beneﬁt more equally. Together all these
participants can clarify, develop, and act on deep values to protect
each other and ﬂourish. Complementing character education and
social reform is the likelihood that developments in science will
one day enhance personal, including moral, capabilities, and
dispositions, for example, through psycho-behavioral and drug
treatments.
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